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THE VIETNAMESE STATE: Formation and Development

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PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE

II - Unacceptable Neo-Colonialism*

As a rule, a war that ends always debouches into a political settlement. National independence being the crucial question, all foreign interference must be strictly excluded. In words, it is difficult for Mr Nixon to deny that principle. He has been compelled to admit, in awkward terms, that once the war has ended "the other side will still be there." In other words, the Vietnamese are at home in Viet Nam, not the Americans. However, that "other side" was presented by Mr Nixon as a force that is external to South Viet Nam and harbours the darkest designs, in particular the determination to exterminate all other national forces. And Mr Nixon hastened to declare that this would be unacceptable to him, i.e. all the power of the USA would be brought into play to prevent any solution that wouldn't please him.

When Mr Nixon talks about a political solution that would reflect the present correlation of political forces, he simply means that the men put into office by Washington, those financed, armed and trained by the USA, should stay on, however poor the reputation they have among the population.

Let us take a close look at the matter.

Who is Nguyen Van Thieu? A mercenary who from 1945 to 1954 served the French colonialists and fought against his people, and then put himself at the service of Ngo Dinh Diem, i.e. of the Americans, only to betray Diem and win power for himself.

And Nguyen Cao Ky? Also a mercenary of the French colonialists, promoted to the rank of colonel by Ngo Dinh Diem, a man notorious for having bombed and strafed many villages with his own hands, a man who has publicly proclaimed that his "only hero is Hitler"?

And Tran Thien Khiem? He too served the French colonialists as an army officer; he too was a favourite of Diem's.

Even before coming to power, before American intervention, those men had betrayed their country and murdered their fellow-countrymen They have requested massive American intervention, razed thousands of villages to the ground, murdered scores of thousands of people in "pacification" operations, arrested, tortured, deported, executed tens of thousands of their opponents in the cities. They have thrown in jail and tortured students, workers, Buddhists, parliamentarians; they have closed down and seized dozens of press publications. In Saigon, to speak of peace and neutrality is enough to get oneself arrested.

One perfectly understands that Washington can only find such men in Viet Nam to be their puppets and implement US policy. But it is obvious that to keep such men in power at all costs will lead neither to peace nor to national concord.

Madame Nguyen Thi Binh has been explicit: One must set up in Saigon an administration without Thieu-Ky-Khiem, one that is determined to restore peace and democracy and carry out a policy of neutrality, one that would free all political prisoners and respect the people's democratic rights. With such an administration the Provisional Revolutionary Government will enter into negotiations with a view to working out a political settlement, ending the war and restoring peace.

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* See *Viet Nam Courier* No 291.

SOUTH VIET NAM: The people rise up to wrest back power.

Whither US Pacification Program?

A MAJOR POLICY

In the US endeavour to firmly plant neo-colonialism in South Viet Nam, "pacification" has always occupied an important position. Under Ngo Dinh Diem (1954-1963) it became a "national policy" and was stubbornly opposed by the people who eventually founded in 1960 the South Viet Nam National Front for Liberation. During the "special war" (1961-1965) the Staley-Taylor plan (1962-1963) and the McNamara plan (1963-1965) were put into effect to "pacify" the country, the former in 18 months and the latter in two years. But their failure was so patent that in face of the imminent collapse of the puppet regime, the Americans had to throw in their expeditionary force which soon reached half a million men. Parallel with large-scale "search and destroy" operations, they systematically went on with their pacification program, the "other war" as they nickname it, to conquer the "hearts and minds" of the people. This time the fiasco took huge proportions: owing to the general offensives and uprisings at Tet 1968, pacification was to "start again from scratch" (*AFP*, February 1968).

With Nixon, "pacification" has become the primordial aspect of US strategy, one of the two fundamental components of "Vietnamization."

This is a true war against the people, for it is meant to uproot the Vietnamese resistance (the puppet administration can subsist only if the population is subdued). With the technical means and tactics employed, it assumes the dimensions of a war of extermination. If the land operations of US troops are reduced, aircraft and artillery increase their activities. Villages are destroyed by bombs and their inhabitants marched off against their will to concentration camps. Bulldozers raze crops and what remains of dwelling houses to deter any return of the population. With napalm, chemical products and B-52s the US command does its best to make all life impossible. From among the camps' inmates, soldiers, wicked thugs, informers are recruited. It is a real attempt to sap the South Vietnamese society to its very foundations and its means of survival. Washington thus hopes to win over the peasants and bend them to the will of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique. And each village destroyed is mentioned in communiqués as a new military gain.

EITHER IDIOTS OR LIARS

To placate public opinion, Nixon presents the situation as if victory were at hand. This is no novelty.

In May 1962, after touring South Viet Nam, McNamara said he was "tremendously encouraged" by the development of the war.

In October 1963, Gen. Harkins, commanding the US expeditionary force, found that victory was "just months away," declaring, "I can safely say that the end of the war is in sight." Meanwhile, after a trip to Saigon of the Defence Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the White House issued a communiqué stressing that "the major part of the US military task can be completed by the end of 1965."

(*Continued page* 4)

Nixon's Peace Initiative or an Electioneering Curtain-Raiser?

DO XUAN SANG

THERE are words which mean a lot of things. The word "cease-fire" is a case in point. Who is the mother, the wife who does not have heart-beats at the perspective that the life of her dear ones is now in safety and that they will soon be home again?

In her statement at the 84th plenary session of the Paris Conference, Mme Nguyen Thi Binh made it clear that after the eventual signing of the agreements to end the war and re-establish peace in Viet Nam the parties concerned will enforce the modalities to be fixed for a cease-fire in South Viet Nam, which is perfectly correct. Besides, point I of the above-mentioned statement also indicated that "in case the US government declares it will withdraw from South Viet Nam all its troops and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp by June 30, 1971, the People's Liberation Armed Forces will refrain from attacking the withdrawing troops of the US and those of the other foreign countries in the US camp." It is to be understood that all problems regarding the Vietnamese armed forces in South Viet Nam will be discussed by the Vietnamese parties.

What has Nixon advanced as "a new major peace initiative?"

An immediate cease-fire throughout Indochina, with the belligerents remaining in their present positions. Nixon did not however mention a date for total withdrawal of GIs and US satellite troops and did not answer the question whether he would renounce his hirelings Thieu-Ky-Khiem for an administration "which stands for peace, independence, neutrality, sees to the improvement of the living conditions of the people and enforces democratic liberties," etc., to be formed in Saigon. Those members of the present Saigon administration who favour peace, independence, neutrality and democracy can be considered one of the three components of the provisional coalition government.

Regarding US troops, Nixon said that in spring 1971, that is by June 30, 1971, 260,000 GIs would have repatriated. This would mean that 289,000 officers and soldiers would remain in the South. To this should be added 60,000 South Korean troops hired at long term by the US for 200 million dollars per year as the result of "frank talks" between Agnew and Pak Jung Hi in Seoul in August last, and several thousand Thai soldiers whose service is also paid in dollars. The puppet army has a strength—at least on paper—of over one million men (regular units, regional troops and combat police). A cease-fire-in-place would turn the cities, ports and other US bases into true "sanctuaries" for GIs, mercenaries and puppet troops who would take advantage of it to recuperate and gird themselves for future operations. With regard to total withdrawal of US, Thai and South Korean troops, it would be delayed *sine die* for the US President proposed only to "discuss" its timetable. One is doubtlessly aware of the "good will" and "diligence" of the American negotiators at Pan-Mun-Jom, Paris and elsewhere!

Furthermore, Nixon does not want to part with his Thieu-Ky-Khiem agents. Taking up the cudgels on their behalf, he went so far as to wrest Mme Nguyen Thi Binh's elucidations by ascribing to the PRG of the RSVN the intention to "dismantle the organized non-communist forces," and charging them with arrogating to itself the right to "exclude whomever they wish from future government."

In such conditions the Nixon offer of an immediate cease-fire-in-place is tantamount to a demand for recognition of US occupation of the controlled areas in South Viet Nam and chiefly the acceptance of the regime of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem fascists who will organize the "free general elections" their own way, under their gun muzzles, with purchase of votes, deceit and other tricks as in the 1967 elections which thrust Thieu into the presidency and Ky into the vice-presidency of the "Republic of Viet Nam." Such a cease-fire in Cambodia would mean recognition by the Cambodian people and their legitimate government of the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak anti-constitutional administration whose writ does not run beyond Phnom Penh.

Nixon wanted to kill two birds with one stone: On the one hand, respond to the serious and sensible proposals of the PRG of the RSVN with absurd and unacceptable counter-proposals, on the other, hoodwink the American public with such pious words as cease-fire, total troop withdrawal, release of POWs, and self-determination of the South Vietnamese people.

Following his high-sounding speech on October 7, he has just announced a withdrawal of 40,000 GIs (included in the contingent of 150,000 men already announced and which does not alter in anyway the total of 260,000 repatriated at the June 30, 1971 deadline) and has made a more spectacular statement about the cancellation in the coming years of the draft system applied since 1948: the future US army would be a professional one composed of generously paid volunteers. In short, a carefully prepared series of electoral manoeuvres.

Nixon bragged that his speech had received the approval of the senators. However, one still remembers the vote of the American Congress for the "Second Tonking Gulf Incident": many of them have regretted it.

The situation of the US and quislings in South Viet Nam and Indochina looks like a "crazy quilt." Large splits may happen at anytime.

The American electors will think twice before casting their ballots in November, for they understand that it is Nixon the President who has "Vietnamized," that is, continued, the war while Nixon the presidential nominee had given solemn promise to put an end to it. A consolidation of Nixon's position in November will only result in the continuation for the US of a losing criminal war, inflation, recession, unemployment and the worsening of all imbalances in the US society.

DRVN News in Brief

- On October 18, President Ton Duc Thang sent a congratulatory message to Anwar El Sadat on the occasion of his appointment as President of the **United Arab Republic**.
- On the first anniversary of the October 21 Revolution of **Somalia**, Ton Duc Thang, President of the DRVN has sent a congratulatory message to Mohamet Siad Barre, Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Somalia.
- At the invitation of the DRVN Government, a delegation of the **Swedish** Government visited North Viet Nam from October 12 to 19.

The delegation, led by Arne Bjornberg, Swedish Ambassador to Peking and Hanoi, included Lennart Klackenberg, Secretary of State of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ernst Micheneck, Director-General of the Swedish Central Office of International Aid and Promotion. It was received by Premier Pham Van Dong and had talks with a DRVN government delegation led by Minister Nguyen Van Kha, Vice-Chairman of the State Planning Committee. The negotiations were about a Swedish plan of aid for the rehabilitation of North Viet Nam after the war.

- Economic negotiations between the DRVN and the People's Republic of **Albania** were conducted in Hanoi on October 20 between the delegations of the two countries, respectively led by Tran Huu Duc, Viet Nam Workers' Party Central Committee member and Minister at the Premier's Office, and Jorgji, Albanian Ambassador to Hanoi.
- A grand meeting was held on October 19 in Hanoi to commemorate the 24th founding anniversary of the Viet Nam Women's Union.

In the name of the CC of the Union, Mme Le Thi Xuyen, Vice-President, acclaimed the considerable successes achieved by Vietnamese women and their contribution to the struggle against US aggression and to socialist construction.

- The DRVN Government issued on September 24, 1970 a decision on the improvement of the training of middle-level technicians.
- The Nam Dinh textile mill overfulfilled the production plan of the 3rd quarter of 1970 by 120 per cent in total value. The weaving workshop produced an additional length of one million metres of textile.
- Coal production exceeds the plan of the third quarter of 1970 by 2.3 per cent and 64.3 per cent compared with the same period last year.

At the end of September 1970, the coal mining enterprise achieved 88.7 per cent of the annual plan of production of coal and 80.9 per cent of the plan for construction of galleries.

- In last September, the Economic and Planning College held its 8th graduation ceremony. Of the 536 graduates, 30 per cent were women and 3 per cent ethnic minorities.
- The Hanoi-Moscow air line via Vientiane, Calcutta, Karachi and Tashkent, inaugurated in June 1969, has been functioning on a regular basis since October 15.

89th Plenary Session of Paris Conference on Viet Nam (Oct. 22, 1970)

CLOSER CRITICAL SCRUTINY OF NIXON'S TRICK

A closer critical analysis of Nixon's Oct. 7 speech was made by Mme Nguyen Thi Binh and Mr Xuan Thuy, respectively heads of the RSVN PRG delegation and the DRVN delegation.

Mr Xuan Thuy pointed out that regarding withdrawal of US troops from South Viet Nam, Nixon had taken a tougher position, binding it to the general settlement of the Indochinese problem, thereby adding a new condition to his old "principles."

With regard to the South Vietnamese's right to self-determination, he obdurately set his face against the formation of a provisional coalition government and continued to cling to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, instrument of US neo-colonialism.

Concerning the cease-fire-in-place all over Indochina, Mr Xuan Thuy held that if such a cease-fire was enforced, it would legalize the presence in South Viet Nam of 400,000 GIs and 70,000 mercenaries of US satellite countries, while nearly one million soldiers, policemen, and security agents of the Saigon puppet administration would have the "right," for the sake of "maintaining order" in the areas under their control, to take harsh measures against a people stripped of all means of self-defence against the aggressors and their lackeys.

Finally, Mr Xuan Thuy declared his flat rejection of Nixon's five points and re-affirmed that only the solution put forth by the PRG of the RSVN could pave the way for a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam problem.

SEPT. 2, 1945 SEPT. 2, 1970

The D.R.V.N. is 25 Years Old

THE VIETNAMESE STATE: Formation and Development

SINCE its birth, the Vietnamese state has addressed itself to a double task: to fight against imperialism to safeguard its independence, and to build a new economy and society.

Though busy with political jobs, the state did not neglect its economic and cultural functions.

It took urgent measures to boost production, practice thrift and check famine. A national defence fund was created, fed in part by a gold-collecting week warmly responded to by the people. The former colonial economic legislation was abolished. The first Vietnamese currency was issued.

DRVN first general elections (Jan. 6, 1946).

THE FIRST STEPS OF PEOPLE'S POWER (1945 - 1946)

STRESS was laid on the political functions of the state in the first years of the new power.

The first step taken by the DRVN was to overthrow the feudal-colonial administration. Many decrees were signed to abolish the services of the ex-government general, all ranks of mandarins and cantonal and communal agents.

General elections were held. On January 6, 1946 from North to South, the Vietnamese people turned out in their numbers to vote. Two months later, the National Assembly was convened to pass the first constitution (1946) and choose the official government.

Later came local elections. The people's councils selected administrative committees at various levels.

Economic, technical services and ordinary tribunals were soon organized. Special tribunals were set up to punish all breaches of the security of the state and public order.

The state promulgated democratic liberties, reduction of land rents, the 8-hour workday, equality between various nationalities, equality between man and woman and freedom of belief.

In a short period of time, a new state apparatus was set up on democratic and legal foundations.

THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION AND THE FIRST RESISTANCE (1946-1954)

A simple, flexible, efficient and economical administration was formed to lead the resistance war.

The state power was entrusted to the government assisted by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. Local elections were temporarily suspended. The country was divided into resistance zones headed by a resistance and administrative committee to lead the fight in each region.

The state administration thus relied on the firm central leadership and a strong regional organization reaching down to villages. Resistance and administrative committees operated even in enemy-controlled localities.

Since 1948 with the progress of the war, strenuous efforts were made by the basic strata of the people, chiefly poor peasants, to speed up the democratic revolution, strengthen the economic and financial role of the state in order to expand the productive forces especially in the countryside. First of all, democratize the state structure, draw larger and larger part of toiling people into its management chiefly at grassroots level.

After re-institution of their elections, the people's councils again exercised their right of control over the elected members of resistance and administrative committees. The ratio of worker and peasant representatives increased unceasingly to reach the absolute majority at district and village levels in the time of agrarian reform.

In 1950, democratization was achieved in the judiciary system. The people's tribunals took the place of special tribunals and ordinary tribunals.

Democratization was also carried out to reinforce control over technical services of the state power organs like the government and resistance and administrative committees at corresponding levels.

Important economic reforms were put into effect at an accelerated tempo.

In order to improve and stabilize the financial and monetary situation, the decrees signed in 1951 unified the system of taxation and centralized the revenues and expenditures of the state.

The Viet Nam State Bank was established which issued a new banknote, the *dong*, to make up for the old Treasury bonds. The unique agricultural tax replaced all the taxes levied on the peasants. This graduated tax collected in kind help lighten the tax burden of the poor peasants while raising the income of the state and guaranteeing supply for the army.

The state trade service was set up in 1951. Decrees regulated the constitution of state enterprises and the participation of workers in their management.

A decree dated May 22, 1950 enforced a radical change in civil law transactions. It curbed the freedom of enterprise and contract signing and laid down the principle that the rights in civil law can be exercised only in conformity with the people's interests. The same act decreed the equality of woman in matrimonial relations and inheritance rights.

A reform in education was initiated in 1950. The nine-year general education was instituted together with vocational schools. A new curriculum was prepared and schooling was conducted in a scientific, national and popular manner.

Special attention should be paid to the agrarian question. In 1949 and the following years, measures of a progressive character were adopted and lead to a vote by the National Assembly on land reform in December 1953.

The Vietnamese state henceforth was laid on a new economic foundation: land ownership of the peasantry. The worker-peasant alliance which forms its bases was strengthened. At grassroots level, the power was effectively in the hands of the peasants placed under the leadership of Party organizations.

STREAMLINING THE SOCIALIST STATE APPARATUS

AFTER liberation of North Viet Nam in 1954, the building of a national and democratic state was completed.

The Vietnamese state had to simultaneously carry out two strategic tasks of the new revolutionary stage:

– socialist construction in the North,

– contribution to free the South from US neo-colonialism, and progress toward the peaceful reunification of the country.

The state apparatus had to be re-organized. Its structure decentralized during the resistance was outgrown. Socialist construction on the basis of a planned large-scale production called for a state strengthened in accordance with modernization and the principle of democratic centralism. Hence, abolition of the resistance zones. The provinces and big towns, now administrative, economic and strategic units, were

(Continued page 7)

Land reform:
- *The peasants are distributed buffaloes and oxen (above).*
- *Land to the tillers (center).*
- *President Ho Chi Minh visiting a mutual-aid team formed by peasants after land reform (below).*

PEACE AND INDEPENDENCE

(Continued from page I)

Elections will be held, not by the Thieu-Ky-Khiem administration in the presence of the American expeditionary corps, but by a provisional coalition government, which will include:

— members of the Provisional Revolutionary Government;

— members of the Saigon administration who sincerely approve of a policy of independence, peace, neutrality and democracy!

— people representing various political, social religious forces including those who for political reasons have been forced to take refuge abroad, who approve of a policy of independence peace, neutrality and democracy.

This provisional coalition government will carry out a policy of neighbourly relations with Laos and Cambodia, based on respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The fate awaiting US aggressors in South Viet Nam.

The Vietnamese parties will negotiate among themselves to settle the problem of Vietnamese armed forces present in South Viet Nam. The modalities for the country's reunification will be defined through negotiations between the authorities in the two zones, North and South, without foreign interference.

Such a solution will only keep off those who stubbornly stand for war and repression, who spend their lives betraying their people and can only survive by hanging on to the coat-tails of foreigners.

Such a solution is vigorously rejected by Mr Nixon, for it no longer allows Washington to hold control over the essential workings of the country. National independence and respect for the Vietnamese people's sovereignty prohibit all neo colonialist manoeuvre. Starting in 1954, Washington has set up in South Viet Nam a puppet administration, army and policy, which serve as a screen. Hundreds of billions of dollars, hundreds of thousands of American lives have been squandered in an attempt to impose that neo-colonialist policy. One understands that American imperialism won't very willingly release its hold. The pill is too bitter for those who had all along believed that by dint of dollars and weapons they might attain to world hegemony.

To withdraw completely and unconditionally, within a set time-limit, all American troops from South Viet Nam, to stop trying to impose puppets upon the Vietnamese people — such actions will honour the American nation, give it back its prestige in the international arena, and make easier the settlement of its internal problems. For the old hawk that Mr Nixon is, for the champions of neo-colonialism, such things are 'unacceptable."

But if Mr Nixon truly wants peace, he must know that the Vietnamese people will never accept any form of neo-colonial domination. As for all other peoples, neo-colonialism is for them wholly unacceptable.

III. THE TRUE QUESTION

FOR the Vietnamese people, as for all men of good will who have been following the course of events, the true question is less to seek to interpret each word by Mr Nixon than to ask, "Does Nixon truly want peace?"

Richard Nixon is no stranger for the Vietnamese people. In 1954, when he was Vice President of the USA, he was a staunch supporter of US air and naval intervention to save the French garrison of Dien Bien Phu from defeat. On March 15, 1965, after Mr Johnson had ordered an all-out bombing of the DRVN and the landing of GIs in South Viet Nam, Mr Nixon declared in the American Senate that the only solution was "to end the war by winning it in South Viet Nam" (Congressional Record). Mr Nixon took office at a time when the four-party conference had started in Paris and when American and world public opinion was eagerly hoping for a radical shift in American policy. He had his hands completely free to restore peace in Viet Nam. But he didn't choose peace: he simply opted for "Vietnamizing the war."

The appointment of Cabot Lodge to replace Harriman at the Paris conference was significant. When he was ambassador in Saigon, Lodge had been the most obstinate protector of the puppet military junta and the partisan of all-out war: the war, he said, would fade away when American and Saigon troops had decimated the revolutionary forces (interview with US News and World Report).

"Vietnamization" became the official doctrine of the Nixon administration, with two main components:

— To quickly reinforce the puppet army: supply it with ultramodern equipment, aircraft, ships and armoured vehicles in sufficient quantities; recruit more regular and auxiliary troops to bring the total to over one million men. The war will go on with this only difference that Saigon troops will gradually replace American GIs on the battlefields.

— To intensify "pacification," which consists firstly in multiplying air, artillery and naval bombardments on the countryside so as to make life untenable for the rural populations who are, besides, subjected to incessant mop-ups. Specialized teams of killers murder and massacre all suspects. In many villages, the people are forcibly taken by helicopter to concentration camps; bulldozers raze all dwellings and crops so as to make their return impossible.

With "Vietnamization" the war has increased in intensity and ferocity: if participation by American ground forces has diminished, that of US air and naval forces has been intensified. According to official American figures, while in 1968, a total of 1,431,134 tons of bombs had been dropped on Laos, North Viet Nam and South Viet Nam, in 1969, when the bombing of North Viet Nam had ceased, the bomb tonnage remained practically the same: 1,389,000 tons. In 1970, air bombing has not abated. (Figures quoted by the French paper Le Monde *of July 29, 1970). In Laos, the number of air sorties, since Mr Nixon took office, has reached unprecedented figures — up to 1,500 per day. In South Viet Nam, whole regions have been turned into "white areas." As to the DRVN, not only is she flown over daily by American reconnaissance aircraft, but many of her localities have been severely bombarded, especially in early May 1970. Intensive use has been made of B-52 super-bombers.*

The withdrawal of American ground forces, aimed at placating somewhat US public opinion, has been carried out piecemeal so as not to affect the combat potential of the US-puppet armies. Whereas Clifford, Johnson's Secretary of Defense, had estimated that 300,000 men would have been withdrawn by the end of 1970, Mr Nixon promises only 260,000 for mid-1971. Besides, Mr Nixon and Mr Melvin Laird have said that this withdrawal will depend on results obtained by the Saigon army. This is tantamount to saying that so long as a government devoted to Washington is not solidly installed in Saigon, the military power of the USA will continue to be present. In fact this has been the aim pursued by American imperialism ever since 1954 with all the means it can muster; the Nixon administration has not changed its target in the least. The war must continue so as to allow the Saigon administration to seize total control of the country; such is the fundamental problem, as Melvin Laird, Nixon's Secretary of Defense, declared before Congress in March 1970.

Mr Nixon has gone even further than Mr Johnson. He has intensified the war in Laos and expanded it to Cambodia. In Laos, the Nixon doctrine has been put to the test: the forces of Vientiane, those of Vang Pao and Thai units, acting in co-ordination under the command of 12,000 US advisers and supported by US aircraft, have launched large-scale offensives against the free zones in 1969-70.

The attack on Cambodia, an independent and neutral country, has brutally exposed Mr Nixon's true intentions. American and Saigon forces, sent to Cambodia in the space of a few days, were bigger than any hitherto used by the US command in the largest operations. Saigon troops have been sent to Cambodia, Thai troops to Cambodia, Laos and South Viet Nam, Pak Jung Hi's South Korean troops and Filipino troops to South Viet Nam. Mr Nixon's big scheme is thus put into practice: Asians will fight Asians in defence of US interests in Asia. And a Thai or South Korean soldier costs 20 times less than a GI.

According to AP (July 10, 1970), should "Vietnamization" succeed, it would be enough for Washington to maintain in South Viet Nam about 50,000—100,000 men plus a fairly numerous puppet army, the whole thing costing only 5 billion dollars a year. At this price, Nixon's guess is that American opinion will not react.

When Mr Nixon cried out, "We are a strong people. America has never been defeated in our proud 190-year history and we shall not be defeated in Viet Nam" (speech of November 3 1969), when he threatened, "I repeat what I said on November 3 and December 15: if I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Viet Nam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation" (speech of April 20, 1970, one should simply understand this to mean: he wants to win the war and believes he can win it.

Washington still pursues its plans for hegemony and especially aims its effort at the countries of the Third World: blinded by their faith in technical means, the champions of neo-colonialism believe that it would be enough to drop more bombs, field new chemical, electronic, naval weapons, use new tactics, to bear down a penurious people like the Vietnamese. For that purpose, they have shrunk and will shrink from no crimes. Mr Nixon, leaving it to Mr Agnew to say improper things, has become more circumspect is his words, not his acts.

But, as they have done until now, the Vietnamese people and their friends will never lay down their arms so long as American aggression continues.

From Truman to Eisenhower, from Kennedy to Johnson, American presidents have left no stone unturned in their effort to impose American domination on Viet Nam. They have resorted to every means, and met with failure at every turn. Mr Nixon, more ambitious, has wanted to expand his intervention to all the three countries of Indochina, while the political and strategic position of the USA has been on the wane and the peoples of Indochina have acquired a rich experience of revolutionary struggle and consolidated their militant unity. By his manoeuvres, Mr Nixon may get a few more votes at the elections, but his policy is doomed to failure.

NGUYEN KHAC VIEN

Lao People's Liberation fighters hunting enemy aircraft on Xieng Khoang battlefield.

NIXON: The Man and His Policy

III – Nixon and US New Global Strategy

NGUYEN CHUNG

(Concluded)

AN OBVIOUS STEP BACKWARD, BUT WITH GREATER OBSTINACY AND TRICKINESS

IT is in the light of the setbacks of US foreign policy in the world, especially in Viet Nam, that the master of the White House has learnt the lesson that it should not send inconsiderately expeditionary forces, chiefly land forces, to other countries, more particularly Asia. A double retreat has been seemingly undertaken. Insofar as new commitments are concerned, the priority areas have been re-examined: US imperialism must from now on set a limit to its commitments and interventions, give preference to some areas, and avoid some others, as the result of a "cautious valuation" of American interests, "lurking dangers" likely to threaten the latter and "means" used by the US imperialists to cope with them. As Defense Secretary Melvin Laird said, the Nixon doctrine "involves a new, more prudent policy towards Asia and permits full recognition of our vital security interests in Europe." Henceforth, the US can no longer afford to scatter its forces but must give priority to the consolidating of its position in Europe considered to be a strategic terrain of prime importance.

With regard to strategic methods, Nixon's backdown lies in the reticence to deploy land forces in a "limited war" in the rescue of puppet regimes in distress, which does not preclude the intensive use of air and naval forces. The Pentagon must resort more intensely to (local or regional) puppet troops to repress the people who long for emancipation. A first application of paramount importance of this theory will be "Vietnamization."

In the build-up and deployment of its "general purpose forces," the US is resolved to give up the "2 1/2 war" principle and adopt the "1 1/2 war" strategy:

"The stated basis of our conventional posture in the 1960's was the so-called '2 1/2 war' principle. According to it, US forces would be maintained for a three-month conventional forward defence of NATO, a defence of Korea or Southeast Asia against a full-scale Chinese attack, and a minor contingency — all simultaneously. These force levels were never reached. In the effort to harmonize doctrine and capability, we choose what is best described as the '1 1/2 war' strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with contingency elsewhere" (Nixon's Feb. 18, 1970 report).

As has been seen, that new strategy has brought to broad daylight the serious handicaps of the present means of action of US imperialism. While acknowledging the weakening of US positions, Nixon is still persisting in affirming the "primordial role" played by the US in the world, the US "leadership" in the NATO and the maintenance of present commitments.

In his report, the US chief executive put forth three fundamental principles for his new global strategy: collective partnership, US strength, and the will to negotiate. A survey of these three principles will show Nixon's obstinacy in pursuing his plans for world hegemony and his craftiness in the means resorted to.

The US does not want to withdraw from the international arena nor to forsake its role as world gendarme. What matters for it is to re-divide the responsibilities with its allies, to change the kind of US supremacy and achieve a maximum efficiency.

Nixon always regards US strength — military power in the case—as the keystone of his global strategy. He is trying to repose it on the reinforcement of the NATO military bloc and strengthening of the military collusion between the US and Japan, all directed against the socialist camp and the revolutionary movement in the world. All is fair to impede the march of the peoples to independence and freedom, including subversion, economic and military aids to the reactionary regimes in the Third World.

However, Nixon's plans are more skilfully camouflaged than those of his predecessors. The US is endeavouring to put a "low profile" on its international relations. It will learn how to be less arrogant, more humble towards its allies in Western Europe and Japan, mitigate the antagonisms existing between it and its allies, and will make, if necessary, some concessions to win over allies and gather their forces under its direction (under the guise of collective partnership and division of responsibilities). It will seek to employ its allies as shock forces and world policemen in its own stead (as in the case of West Germany and Japan). It will involve them in collective aid plans whose true goal is to impose neo-colonialism on developing nations (as the role played by Japan in Asia). The presence of the allies at the side of the US will also be conducive to strengthening US position in face of the socialist world, in eventual confrontations as well as negotiations.

In its relations with the Third World, the US will also do its utmost to be flexible. In order to build up, consolidate and broaden the foundations of neo-colonialism in these countries, it will woo various sections of the local bourgeoisie, chiefly with economic and technical aid, not neglecting the efforts to train, equip and organize local or regional armies to quell the mass movements.

The same pliability will govern the relations between the US and socialist countries. To believe Nixon, an era of negotiations will open up to bring about a *détente* with the Soviet Union and People's China and to improve the relations with Eastern European countries by starting "bilateral negotiations" or "multilateral negotiations."

Such is, in a nutshell, Nixon's new peace strategy.

The people in Haarlem (Holland) demonstrating against US aggression in Southeast Asia and war extension to all Indochina.

Londoners demonstrating in front of US embassy against Nixon's war policy.

PRETTY GLOOMY PROSPECTS

IN fact, it is the vamping of some trite formulas taken from Kennedy by a man known for long as a true "hawk," making a jumble of calculations full of wishful thinking to strengthen and re-deploy his own forces and make use of others' forces to consolidate the wobbling positions of the US as the first imperialist power.

Militarily speaking, that new strategy is an attempt to restore the "flexible response" strategy. It urges its West European allies to do their bits in the build-up of NATO conventional forces so that it can devote its resources to increase its atomic arsenal: such a "division of responsibilities" will lead to tighter US control over the Atlantic alliance and US atomic supremacy over the socialist countries. Meanwhile, the reconditioning of the puppet armies combined a recourse to a "1 1/2 war" will enable Washington to keep in check popular movements for independence, democracy and social progress now spreading throughout the world.

Politically and economically the implementation of Nixon's new strategy will strengthen the dollar, improve the balance of US foreign trade and account, thanks to the co-operation of West European allies and Japan. The US will feather its own nest with this in order to speed up its overseas investments, increase aid to countries in the Third World under the disguise of collective undertaking in which the allies will share the risks and play the role of Uncle Sam's acolytes.

However, the rulers of such countries as France, West Germany and Japan are not so stupid as to be deluded by Nixon's honey words. What matters is not the "low profile" in diplomacy, nor minor concessions made by the US, but rather the workings of the law of unequal development in capitalist countries, chiefly at a time when the general crisis of world capitalism is aggravating: instead of abating, the antagonisms between the US and its allies will be inevitably exacerbated.

Nixon must not entertain any illusions about the efficacy of his coaxing and divisive tricks with regard to the socialist camp and newly independent countries.

Above all, there are the realities in Viet Nam and Indochina. The failure of the experimentation of the "Nixon doctrine" in the form of Vietnamization is a foregone conclusion. The US war in Indochina remains the root of the untold difficulties faced by the US in the economic, financial, social and political field. It casts a gloom on Washington's relations with countries of all tendencies. By prolonging and spreading it, the US, far from putting a "low profile" on itself, exposes all its ugliness, arrogance and barbarity. There is no sign that further applications of the new "peace strategy" of Nixon in other parts of the globe will erase that image, and that that strategy will not be doomed to failure.

Next issue:

NIXON'S ASIAN POLICY

4,500 Enemy Troops Wiped Out in 5 Weeks on 4 Theatres of Operations

KHMER Information Agency (KIA) in the last week reported that the Cambodian patriots had scored important successes in Taing Kauk and Roca Kong sectors (North-North-east), Siemreap (North-North-west) and Svayrieng (South-east of Phnom Penh).

Since early September, the "biggest offensive campaign" launched by Lon Nol troops to clear Road No 6 up to Kompong Thom has been foiled up at **Taing Kauk**, 75km from Phnom Penh.

On September 13, 300 troops of a Lon Nol battalion were wiped out by the Khmer National Liberation Armed Forces (KNLAF), south of Taing Kauk. On Sept. 16, 200 others were knocked out near Bakhoni, same sector. On Sept. 18, an enemy column leaving Skoun for Taing Kauk was intercepted 12 km north of Skoun, taking 300 casualties. On Sept. 23 and 24, KNLAF also whitled down 2 Lon Nol battalions at Taing Kauk.

On Oct. 4, the patriots put out of action many dozen enemy troops when a Lon Nol company was ambushed north of Taing Kauk and 2 other companies coming to its rescue intercepted, resulting in over one hundred enemy casualties. On the night of Sept. 5, the patriots hammered at 4 positions, writing off one company and decimating 3 others, disabling 400 adverse soldiers. The following day 200 other Lon Nol troops were wiped out near Bakhom and 60 at Taing Kauk. On Oct. 7, a battalion, badly mauled at Bakhom, lost 400 men. In total, in Taing Kauk area, from Sept. 7 to Oct. 7, 2,500 Lon Nol soldiers were knocked out.

On Oct. 11, KNLAF stormed in the day **Roca Kong**, a post on the bank of the Mekong River and important point in the defence line around Phnom Penh, about 30km from the capital city, wiping out a company of Lon Nol Ranger Battalion 15; the enemy suffered 150 casualties (3 officers) and lost 50 fire-arms captured.

On Oct. 10, at **Siemreap** town, near Angkor, the patriotic forces put out of action 130 adverse troops, including 4 officers and 10 men of the Saigon army. The following day, an F4 Phantom was downed 4km from this town.

In the **Svayrieng** area, 108km from Phnom Penh, on Highway No 1 between Phnom Penh and Saigon, 1,500 adverse troops were knocked out of action and 30 military vehicles (20 M. 113) destroyed in the first 3 weeks of September. The signal successes in this sector were: the onset on Sept. 1 against enemy forces in the provincial capital which inflicted on them 230 casualties; the Svayrieng engagement (Sept. 3) in which the Saigon puppets lost 100 men and 3 M. 113 cars; the Sept. 7 attack on 2 Saigon companies at Loco which cost the Saigon mercenaries 150 casualties and 3 armoured vehicles wrecked; the Sept. 11 assault on Prasaut (the site of the first slaughter of Vietnamese residents by Lon Nol in March last) and in a locality west of Svayrieng in which 4 Saigon companies had 350 men killed or wounded, 19 military vehicles and 3 155mm guns destroyed and a plane downed.

The Saigon command in Cambodia reported that at Neak Luong a warship had been sunk by the Khmer patriots with 25 casualties among crewmen.

GI Anti-War Protest Grows

ACCORDING to a document recently made public by the US Defense Department the number of deserters in the US Army since early 1970 has reached 81,000. In comparison with the figures previously released, it is clear the desertion rate has been rising:

1966-1967: 42,227
1967-1968: 53,357
1968-1969: over 50,000.

The total of over 30 days AWOLs has been growing too:

1966-1967: 134,668
1967-1968: 155,536
1968-1969: 200,000.

Draft centres also announced that the number of American youth prosecuted by the US administration for opposition to military service decupled as against that of five years ago (*AP*, Aug. 28, 1970). It also remarked that the American youth's draft resistance sharply rose in the Viet Nam war and kept mounting. After investigating the situation for a time, columnist Stewart Alsop estimated that the number of American youth dodging military service and US troops deserting to Canada to avoid the Viet Nam war ran to at least from 25,000 to 30,000 and after Nixon's bringing the war to Cambodia more than one thousand young men ran away to Toronto every week. He also reported that while many American young men and mutineers continued going to Canada, lot of others decided to stay at home to face the Nixon authorities and fight for an end to the war and to the deployment of their mates to Viet Nam. They not only took an active part in anti-war movements right in the USA but also made a worthy contribution to the development of anti-war organizations in units of US navy, land force and air force at home as well as overseas.

In South Viet Nam American troops have many times disobeyed their direct commanders' combat orders. Many refused to go to Cambodia. *The Baltimore Sun* recently related what an American soldier had observed after coming back from the battlefield: "Everybody knows that the USA cannot win this war." That is the reason why US troops disliked the Pentagon's continuation of the Viet Nam war which they regarded as "illegal and immoral."

In Japan, the "Tokyo Committee for Mobilization" and many other anti-war organizations of American militarymen and residents came into being, notably those of soldiers at US military bases. A group in Okinawa in last July circulated an underground paper calling on their friends there to stand against the Viet Nam war of aggression and Nixon's expanding the war to the whole of Indochina. In Iwakuni, one of the most important air bases of US marines, some 200 US soldiers staged a two days' demonstration (Sept. 30 and Oct. 1, 1970) to say no to the Viet Nam war of aggression and passed a resolution for militarymen's right to assembly and demonstration. On July 4 at this base too, a number of American troops fought back against American military policemen for 14 hours running. They set up an anti-war society with a 350-membership. At other US bases in Yokosuka and Itasuke there also appeared many anti-war organizations. Some

(Continued page 8)

Lao People's Liberation Armed Forces Inflict 850 Enemy Casualties at Xieng Khoang, Saravane, Attopeu

THE Lao PLAF routed the Vientiane forces' encroaching on the free zones of Saravane and Attopeu, *KPL* Agency reported. From end of August to beginning of October, the enemy took 650 casualties and lost 240 fire-arms to the patriots.

In the Xieng Khoang — Plain of Jars area, from Oct. 5 to 13, the Lao PLAF put out of action 200 Vang Pao men and captured or destroyed many hundred weapons and a big quantity of war materials and equipment.

Stepped Up B-52 Raids

KPL Agency has just released a Lao People's Liberation Army High Command's protest, dated October 17, against US aggressors' intensified B.52 raids in Lao territory. The declaration exposed the transfer of a number of B.52s and RC.130-type modern recon planes from American bases in Okinawa to new bases in Thailand. It also strongly condemned the American imperialists' cynical statement that with this operation US bombings of Laos, Viet Nam and Cambodia could be multiplied.

GIs wounded in Cambodia. →

GIFTS FROM THE "FRENCH PEOPLE'S AID"

ON the afternoon of October 9, 1970, the "French People's Aid" held a ceremony to hand gifts to Viet Nam for Vietnamese orphans.

The gifts included clothes and anti-biotics to the value of 12 million old francs (or 120,000 new francs) and will be sea-shipped to Viet Nam.

Present at the ceremony in Paris were Raymond Guyot, member of the Poitbureau of the CC of the French Communist Party, the representative of the "French People's Aid" and many other members of that organization.

Tran Viet Dung, advisor to the DRVN General Delegation in Paris and Le Van Loc, delegate per proxy of the Delegation of the PRG of the RSVN at the Paris Conference on Viet Nam, received the gifts

They expressed the profound gratitude of the Vietnamese people toward the French people who have been staunchly supporting their struggle against US aggression, for national salvation.

Up to now, the "French People's Aid" has dispatched to the Vietnamese people 15 ambulance-cars, 100 surgical instrument kits, over 1 ton of antibiotics and over 100 tons of condensed milk.

In February 1968 the "French People's Aid" sent to Viet Nam 55 tons of gifts on a "boat to Viet Nam."

THE VIETNAMESE STATE: Formation and Development

(Continued from page 3)

placed under the direct management of the government. The number of ministries doubled from 1954 to 1959. Some of them were split into many others. Thus the former Ministry of Industry and Commerce was divided into three new ministries: Industry, Home Trade and Foreign Trade. New organs were set up: the National Planning Board, the State Scientific Committee, the Government Inspectorate General.

Parallel to that centralization, there was a democratization of the state apparatus from top to bottom. The National Assembly functioned regularly. The government had to give periodical accounts of its activities either directly to it or to its Standing Committee. Two autonomous zones were established for ethnic minorities. The re-instituted local elections resulted in the consolidation of the people's councils. The resistance committees were dissolved and replaced by administrative committees selected by the people's councils.

A series of decrees enacted the freedom of the press, of assembly, of belief, corporal freedom, inviolability of residence, privacy of correspondence.

After socialist transformation in towns and countryside, it was decided to proceed to an overall re-organization of the state apparatus.

The new constitution was promulgated in 1959. Being a socialist constitution in the transitional period, it stipulated that the DRVN is a people's democratic state relying on the worker-peasant alliance under the leadership of the working class. It strengthened the national united front. Thus the DRVN is characterized by its class and national nature. The constitution laid particular accent on the active role of the state in the economic and social field.

The fundamental political structure of the state consists of the National Assembly and People's Councils, which are the sole organs of the state power. Four laws promulgated on July 26, 1960 instituted the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, tribunals and office of public prosecutions. A law signed on October 27, 1962 bore on the people's councils and their executive committees.

To answer the requirements of good economic management and the fulfilment of the first 5-year plan, new ministries and general departments were created.

In the social field, a provisional charter of social insurances for state workers and employees was put into force. The important January 13, 1960 law dealt with marriage and the family. It regarded conjugal love as foundation of marriage and the new society and guaranteed to women a status worthy of their role in socialist construction.

THE ACID TEST OF THE WAR

WHEN US imperialism brought the war to North Viet Nam in 1965, it fell foul of a Vietnamese state solidly planted on a new economic and social regime.

The DRVN showed a perfect moral and social cohesion. With calm and confidence it organized itself to face aggression.

The April 10, 1965 law extended the duration of military service. The Council of Ministers took decisions to improve the regulation on urgent mobilization of local manpower and resources, on draft labour, communications and transport. Others reinforced public order. The decree signed on October 30, 1967 forestalled the counter-revolutionary activities of the enemy's agents.

The Vietnamese state bent its efforts mainly on economic construction. It had concurrently to keep going the flow of supply to the front and socialist building. Stress was laid on economic regionalization. An ordinance of the Council of Ministers has broadened the attributes and responsibilities of the provincial and municipal administration in the context of local economy. The May 10, 1967 decree aimed at the strengthening of economic and financial management and ensuring of the respect of property of the state, co-operatives and people.

In 1969, a new constitution for agricultural co-operatives was promulgated. A democratic movement was launched in the countryside for a wider participation of the peasants in the management of their economic collectivity. A decision of the Council of Ministers has fixed the compulsory deliveries of foodstuffs to the state by agricultural co-operatives.

FOUR years of bombardments of an unheard-of fury were not able to disrupt the economy and the defence system of the DRVN nor to upset the living conditions of its people.

The acid test of the war has been the best demonstration of the stamina of the Vietnamese state.

TO THE READER

We are aware that there is much room for improvement in the wording of our paper. We apologize for this shortcoming and highly appreciate all your suggestions as they will help us to serve you more efficiently in future.

(Continued from page 1)

Over four years later, on the eve of Tet 1968, the electronic computers of Komer, head of the pacification program in South Viet Nam, showed that 67 per cent of people lived in "security zones."

Nixon goes farther. He claims at present that the biggest problem of his administration consists in shifting from war time to peace time as if the war had been won. More concretely, his Secretary of State Rogers has of late referred to a "no war, no peace" situation, where South Viet Nam "would operate successfully," and where there will be only "terrorist attacks." Chiming in with his bosses, Nguyen Van Thieu affirms that 95 per cent of the territory has been "pacified" while some of his lieutenants hope that 1971 will see the completion of "pacification."

Whither US Pacification Program?

Masters and valets try to hoodwink one another. William J. Lederer, an American author, tells how top military authorities in Saigon, the US embassy staff, JUSPAO and AID showed McNamara, when he visited the country in 1967, "only things which would persuade him to approve their requests and policies" and withheld from him "those things which might result in disadvantage." Recently (July 20, 1970) *Newsweek* reported that the Saigon authorities had let Rogers see a pilot "pacified" village (Phu Tam) in the Mekong Delta. The Secretary of State first "appeared impressed" but realized soon "the unreality of the visit" and "privately, he grumbled about being dragged off into a 'show place' which he felt bore little relation to actual condition in South Viet Nam." This did not prevent Rogers from officially declaring, "It is clear that great progress has been made since last year." While revealing that the chief of the district of the above-mentioned village pays taxes to Saigon as well as to the National Liberation Front, *Newsweek* wrote, "But what the American and Vietnamese guides failed to point out was that neither pacification nor Vietnamization has contributed significantly to Phu Tam's unquestionable well-being."

Explaining this distortion of facts, Lederer holds that "many US officials are either idiots or liars. Sometimes both."

What then is the truth like?

RURAL PACIFICATION PUT TO HARD TEST

TOWARDS the end of 1967, according to US official figures, the Saigon administration was "certain of the loyalty of only 168 hamlets out of 12,537" and claimed "partial control of another 1,776" which, as indicated by the experience of the same American eye-witness, "does not mean much." In 1968, year of general offensives and uprisings, it goes without saying that in the countryside the "security zones" shrank further.

In 1969, after the inauguration of Nixon and under the "accelerated pacification" program, 1,660 hamlets were flattened and hundreds of thousands of people forcibly taken to concentration camps. Since the beginning of 1970, "sweeps" in the populated areas have grown more frequent and murderous. In Ben Tre province (Mekong Delta) alone, from January to April, they numbered 663 during which 18,000 people were killed or wounded, 500 arrested, and 500 houses burnt. In Khanh Lam village, Ca Mau province, "mop-ups" from September 1969 to March 1970 and operations coupled with B.52 bombings and chemical sprayings inflicted 510 casualties and 2,400 poisoned among the civilians.

Stepped-up terror, massacres, systematic devastations have no doubt made things harder for the people and enabled the Saigon administration to encroach upon some areas. But the people soon shifted to the counter-offensive. According to still incomplete data, in the first half of this year, with a 3-million strong force taking part in various actions and thanks to the support of regional troops and guerillas, the inmates of 2,036 "strategic hamlets" rose up and liquidated 4,265 wicked thugs, swept 34 platoons of security agents, disbanded over 100,000 "civil guards" and 115 pacification teams. The people got control of one thousand hamlets and liberated 350,000 detainees there. After the PLAF powerful offensives in April, half of the existing strategic hamlets were dismantled by the end of that month. With drumbeats and tocsins, they besieged enemy posts and forced the garrisons of 245 of them to evacuate. Many platoons of "pacification cadres" joined the liberation forces with their full kits.

Counter-pacification actions reach a particular intensity in many provinces in the Mekong Delta and in the plains of Central Trung Bo. The strategic hamlets destroyed are turned "combat villages."

Besides, after its formation in May 1969, the Provisional Revolutionary Government has appointed organs of the people's power at grassroots level; up to the end of the same year, 37 provinces out of 44 have got their revolutionary people's councils and committees — 15 in Central Trung Bo and 22 in Nam Bo. The setting up of these organs has efficiently helped promote the resistance war and agricultural production as well as other branches of activities.

The Western press has dwelled on the obstacles met by "pacification" in 1970. *AP* of February 10 said that it had been unable to check the military and political activities of the "enemy." *AFP* reported on April 29 that the "Viet Cong" hit hard at it in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces (Central Trung Bo) and it has now virtually fizzled out. After the invasion of Cambodia by US forces (April 30) with the participation of the Saigon puppet troops, the situation grew worse. In its issue of June 30, *Le Monde* wrote that for several months the efforts of the Saigon administration in this respect had been declining and its desperate venture was lacking a political substance. So much so that a puppet general admitted at a conference of representatives of countries having troops in South Viet Nam that the recent intensified activities and military attacks of the "communists" had contributed to a slowdown of the pacification effort (*AFP* and *Reuter*, July 5). To galvanize the population, this general said, the junta in the saddle had to launch on July 1, 1970 the "special pacification" program.

IN fact, pacification is conceived only with the use of armed force as the main instrument. The US imperialists carried it out through the medium of the puppet army from 1954 to 1965, then by the commitment of half a million GIs.

After the failure of the US expeditionary force, it is hard to think that the puppet troops can fare better. The flop of the pacification program in 1970 has the same cause as the successive bankruptcy of the plans which have preceded it since 1954: the iron will of the South Viet Nam people to reject all new forms of colonial slavery and the impotence of all foreign-paid administrations from Bao Dai through Ngo dinh Diem and Nguyen Khanh to Thieu-Ky-Khiem. Nothing is more typical of the fiasco of that rural project than the inability of the US and quislings to maintain "order" even in the towns where their military and police apparatus works in most favourable conditions. If Nixon reckons on the "progress of pacification" to win in Viet Nam, his hopes are not more justified than those of his predecessors.

South Viet Nam

MILITARY OPERATIONS

Mekong Delta

Ca Mau province:

— The field CP and an artillery position of Regiment 33, puppet Infantry Division 21, stormed: 168 enemy casualties (including a captain), 5 105mm pieces, 3 heavy mortars and 7 machine-guns destroyed, and 7 blockhouses and casemates flattened (night of Oct.4).

— 4 war vessels (including a 80m long ship) sunk on Oct.3; 9 others hit (a 150m long ship sunk) on the Tam Giang river and Nam Can canal (Sept. 24): 150 GIs and many puppet soldiers put out of action.

Ben Tre province:

A 100m long war vessel and a landing craft sent to the bottom on the Co Chien river (Mo Cay district): over 100 adverse casualties including an American major (night of August 2).

Western High Plateaux

Gia Lai province:

4 PLAF ambushes on Road No 19 east of Mang Giang pass: 45 enemy military vehicles and about 100 enemy troops knocked out (from 8.30 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Oct.4).

Tuyen Duc province:

An ammunition depot at Dalat blotted out: 45 enemy casualties (night of Sept. 29).

Trung Bo

Binh Dinh province:

Attacks on Tan Oc position (night of Oct.4) and operational base of US Infantry Division at Diem Tieu, Phu My district (Oct. 5): 125 GIs and nearly 100 puppet troops put out of action, an ammunition dump burnt.

Khanh Hoa province:

— 11 military targets in Ninh Hoa district town raided: 1 civil guard company and 4 platoons wiped out, about 50 ruffians killed (Sept. 30).

— One 7,000-ton and one 12,000-ton freighter heavily damaged at Cam Ranh and Nha Trang (Sept. 23 and 29).

Puppet troops of the 1st Division transporting buddies' corpses at O'Reilly base.

Labouring People's Life in US - Puppet - Controlled Areas after the Piastre's Devaluation

ON the evening of October 3, 1970, the Saigon puppet authorities announced over the radio the so-called "parallel market exchange rate," thereby devaluing the Saigon piastre from 118 to one dollar to 275. On the morning of the day after, the black market exchange rate rose from 410 piastres to one dollar to 520. Also on that day the volume of merchandise discreased obviously. The price of some hundred articles were put up from 20 to 60 per cent and that of rice, staple food of the Vietnamese, doubled. In its Oct. 10 issue the Saigon *Sunday Post* disclosed that on various markets in Saigon the price of pork soared up to 20 per cent, of egg 30 and of vegetable nearly 70. According to *Chinh Luan* (Just Opinion), a Saigon paper, home-grown rice disappeared in anticipation of price hike whereas the cost of imported rice rocketed from 3,000 piastres per hundred kilograms to 6,000. The price of many other commodities also rose: after the increase of sugar price to 30 per cent, the cost of coffee, cake, candy, jam and soft drink shot up too. The price of medicines which the puppet authorities had pledged to keep fixed also sharply rose.

A bottle of whooping-cough syrup previously cost 80 piastres, now costs over 200. A tablet of aspirin at the "austerity tax" time cost 5 piastres (although its price had already increased — *VNC*) now fetched 15.

The situation was disastrous for many strata of the population under US-puppet control, especially the civil servants and militarymen living on fixed pay. For example, a school mistress gets a salary of about 4,000 piastres a month but she spends 3,800 for her food. A puppet soldier's pay is 4,250 piastres whereas a quintal of imported rice costs 6,000. Before the puppet administration devalued the Saigon piastre, the *Saigon Moi* (New Saigon) in its Sept. 30 issue told the following dramatic story of a puppet constable: "Nguyen Van Trong, 21 years old, policeman, earns 3,000 piastres a month. With mounting prices, he cannot support a 5-member family. He once thought of suicide. He at last delivered his dependents — a maternal grandmother and three young sisters and brothers — from misery by killing them with his revolver."

Up to now commodity prices are still on the rise.

In addition to this, towns in Central SVN were hit by floods. A Saigon "congressman" has warned that "the Thua Thien and Hue stocks of rice will be empty by October 10" (*Doc Lap*-Independence-Oct. 7) despite a one-third reduction of the rations (from 12 downward to 8 kg per capita) for the townsfolk while each inhabitant of Hue outskirts is allotted only one kilogram a month. Owing to the flood the victims in those places cannot rely on such crops as sweet potatoes, cassava roots, etc., as substitutes for rice. The shortage of rice is thus becoming more and more critical.

In a word, the devaluation of the Saigon piastre by the puppet administration cannot save it from its financial crisis at all, but on the contrary only lands the people under its thumb in greater difficulties and exasperates their discontent with its rule.

GI Anti-War Protest...

(*Continued from page 6*)

Japanese papers have commented that "war dislike and mutinous spirit are prevailing among American troops and translated into anti-war actions," and that the number of Americans running away from their bases in Japan to oppose the US war of aggression in Viet Nam grew with every passing day.

In West Germany, on July 4, 1970, about 1,000 black Americans stationed in Heidelberg held a meeting and put out a statement condemning US aggression war and crimes committed in Viet Nam. In Iceland, early in October 1970 a group of American officers and men published a paper to launch a drive against the Viet Nam war of aggression and urge the Nixon administration pull out all its troops from Southeast Asia. After visiting more than ten military bases in the USA, American newsmen have come to the conclusion that few American soldiers, first and foremost those who had been to Viet Nam, approved the Viet Nam war and that there were many members of anti-war organizations in each base of infantry, navy and marines in the USA, West Germany and right on each warship on high seas.

The above-mentioned movements have enlisted active support of the American people and the peoples of the host countries to US military bases. In the USA many mass organizations were established to help and encourage troops' anti-war actions. Not long ago, West Germany progressive students convened many gatherings to back American mutineers there. Many American lawyers and senators declared for their militarymen and youth's right to refusal to join the Viet Nam war because it ran counter to the Constitution of the USA. They overtly opposed prosecution of American soldiers and young men who protested the war.

The Senates of Massachusetts and Hawaii, the New York City Council, the New York Lawyers' Association, the Democratic Party local committees of Utah, Michigan, etc., have approved resolutions condemning the Viet Nam war and strongly objecting to the Nixon administration's continued draft for it and crack-down on youth, students and mutineers.

It came as no surprise that the Pentagon lately expressed anxiety over American troops' and young men's anti-militarist spirit, over the desertion and anti-draft drive which are now surging in the USA, an unprecedented phenomenon in the military history of this country.

Desertion Rate Runs to 75 Per Cent in Saigon Army, a Puppet Army Corps Commander Admits

AFP quoted 3-star General Do Cao Tri, commanding the 3rd Military Area and 3rd Army Corps, as saying on October 17 at his Bien Hoa HQ that "for every soldier killed in action, nine disappear, mostly deserters."

He also said that "seventy-five in every one hundred soldiers desert, and of the remaining twenty-five, only ten fight."

Let's recall that in its August 11 issue, Look *magazine revealed that, despite the fact that the desertion figure was kept secret, a well-informed Vietnamese disclosed to its correspondent that the monthly rate would run to between 8,000 and 10,000.*